Incentive programs are one of the most important strategies that a corporation has in order to achieve its major policies and goals. The purpose of this paper is to identify these goals and their function, so that we later can analyze the incentive system?s effectiveness. The paper?s focus is on Max Hamburgarerestauranger AB?s incentive system, that is directed to the managers of all of its restaurants.We had interviews with the CEO, as well as the head of the Economics Department of Max H.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine if companies? incentive programs for employees is designed in such a way that it makes it possible for managers to reach their goals. Method: Qualitative with a semi standardised questionnaire Results: Our results is that the incentive programs for employees in their present form don?t give the companies a good possibility to effect the employees to perform towards the goals of the system. The performance measures in the incentive programs for employees is suitable in comparison with the goals of the program but the construction and the use of the systems doesn?t give a satisfied result in comprising with the goals.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine if companies? incentive programs for employees is designed in such a way that it makes it possible for managers to reach their goals. Method: Qualitative with a semi standardised questionnaire Results: Our results is that the incentive programs for employees in their present form don?t give the companies a good possibility to effect the employees to perform towards the goals of the system. The performance measures in the incentive programs for employees is suitable in comparison with the goals of the program but the construction and the use of the systems doesn?t give a satisfied result in comprising with the goals.

The aim of this study is to analyze the justification of a financial incentive that rewards students who rapidly finish their studies within the language education ?Swedish for immigrants? (sfi). Thereby, we want to see what assumptions are made about the students, and relate this to experiences of the education at a local level. We applied a text analysis on a government bill about the incentive, which showed that the deficiencies in the education are said to be caused by the students? lack of effort.

When Swedish authorities are to purchase or rent something, public procurement is used as a means to an end. Authorities as well as suppliers are subjects to the fact that Swedish law regarding public procurement regulates the form of procurement in one set of particular regulations (LOU) and the form of contracts in another set of general regulations (AvtL). Suppliers and purchasing authorities close a contract regarding the subject of procurement and the law of public procurement regulates when such a contract can be closed, simultaneously the law of contracts regulates when parties are held to contracts and when contracts are to be rescinded. I investigate in this essay what these two types of regulations can result in for the contracting parties. As it is today agreements that have been entered into wrongfully still are valid, even if a court of law nullifies the procurement and sentences the purchasing authority to make a new public procurement.

When Swedish authorities are to purchase or rent something, public procurement is used as a means to an end. Authorities as well as suppliers are subjects to the fact that Swedish law regarding public procurement regulates the form of procurement in one set of particular regulations (LOU) and the form of contracts in another set of general regulations (AvtL). Suppliers and purchasing authorities close a contract regarding the subject of procurement and the law of public procurement regulates when such a contract can be closed, simultaneously the law of contracts regulates when parties are held to contracts and when contracts are to be rescinded. I investigate in this essay what these two types of regulations can result in for the contracting parties. As it is today agreements that have been entered into wrongfully still are valid, even if a court of law nullifies the procurement and sentences the purchasing authority to make a new public procurement.

The purpose of this work is to find out how present manager contracts are set up in Landstinget Västmanland (the county council of Västmanland), explore managers? perception of these contracts and why managers have chosen leadership. The work has also reviewed the question if managers need to have a relationship or expertise to the activities they lead and which qualifications are needed in such case. The survey was conducted in two divisions in which nine interviews were held with managers at all levels. In addition to this a questionnaire including the 87 managers in the divisions were held.

The purpose of this case study is to examine and analyze CEO: s and the sales departments incentive program of the case company. Also to find out if the present incentive program is effective.The survey is a case study where a combination of qualitative and quantitative approach has been used. Relevant Theories is applied on the empirical material..

When Swedish authorities are to purchase or rent something, public procurement is used as a means to an end. Authorities as well as suppliers are subjects to the fact that Swedish law regarding public procurement regulates the form of procurement in one set of particular regulations (LOU) and the form of contracts in another set of general regulations (AvtL). Suppliers and purchasing authorities close a contract regarding the subject of procurement and the law of public procurement regulates when such a contract can be closed, simultaneously the law of contracts regulates when parties are held to contracts and when contracts are to be rescinded. I investigate in this essay what these two types of regulations can result in for the contracting parties. As it is today agreements that have been entered into wrongfully still are valid, even if a court of law nullifies the procurement and sentences the purchasing authority to make a new public procurement.

The first aim of this study is to examine what the differences are between the Classic directive (directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts) and the Revised Classic directive (directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC) when it comes to social considerations in public procurement. The second aim is to examine if the revision of the directive has solved the prior existing problems regarding social considerations in public procurement. In this paper a traditional European legal method is used. The examinations show a number of things, including the Revised Classic directive involving codification of case law, references to other sources of law and some clarified rules as well as new provisions. The regulations regarding reserved contracts, technical specifications, and selection criterion are satisfied in the Revised Classic directive.

Agency theory describes the conflict of interest between the principal (stockholders) and the agent (CEO). Aligning the incentives of executives with those of the owners is the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem. If there is no meaningful link between CEO compensation and company performance, it is doubtful that the large sums of assets in public corporations are being managed efficiently. In theory the solution is simple reward the CEO when shareholders wealth increases. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a relationship between company performance and CEO compensation among Swedish companies, in materials and information technology industry.

The first aim of this study is to examine what the differences are between the Classic directive (directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts) and the Revised Classic directive (directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC) when it comes to social considerations in public procurement. The second aim is to examine if the revision of the directive has solved the prior existing problems regarding social considerations in public procurement. In this paper a traditional European legal method is used. The examinations show a number of things, including the Revised Classic directive involving codification of case law, references to other sources of law and some clarified rules as well as new provisions. The regulations regarding reserved contracts, technical specifications, and selection criterion are satisfied in the Revised Classic directive.

We would like to learn more about how the restrictive policy against incentive programmes affects the board’s of Swedish state owned commercial firms ability to govern management in an efficient way. We also want to find out if there are different consequences in reference to this that are not directly linked to corporate governance issues. Our empiric observations have been made in order to profoundly explore the subject and examine it through the eyes of professional individuals, all expressing different views and standpoints. We conclude that the most efficient structure is when an active board is complemented by a well structured and individualised incentive programme. However, this thesis conclude that this structure is not possible given the current guidelines and policies employed by the state, which in turn might lead to sub optimizations in the governing..

The first aim of this study is to examine what the differences are between the Classic directive (directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts) and the Revised Classic directive (directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC) when it comes to social considerations in public procurement. The second aim is to examine if the revision of the directive has solved the prior existing problems regarding social considerations in public procurement. In this paper a traditional European legal method is used. The examinations show a number of things, including the Revised Classic directive involving codification of case law, references to other sources of law and some clarified rules as well as new provisions. The regulations regarding reserved contracts, technical specifications, and selection criterion are satisfied in the Revised Classic directive.

Agency theory describes the conflict of interest between the principal (stockholders) and the agent (CEO). Aligning the incentives of executives with those of the owners is the most direct way to mitigate the agency problem. If there is no meaningful link between CEO compensation and company performance, it is doubtful that the large sums of assets in public corporations are being managed efficiently. In theory the solution is simple reward the CEO when shareholders wealth increases. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is a relationship between company performance and CEO compensation among Swedish companies, in materials and information technology industry.